## Note on level r consensus

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**Abstract.** We show that the hierarchy of level r consensus partially collapses. In particular, any profile  $\pi \in \mathcal{P}$  that exhibits consensus of level (K-1)! around  $\succ_0$  in fact exhibits consensus of level 1 around  $\succ_0$ .

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The concept of level r consensus was introduced in [1] in the context of the metric approach in social choice theory. We will mainly use the notation and definitions of [1]. Let  $A = \{1, 2, ..., K\}$  be a set of K > 2 alternatives and let  $N = \{1, 2, ..., n\}$  be a set of individuals. Each linear order (i.e. complete, transitive and antisymmetric binary relation) on the set A is called a *preference relation*. The set of all preference relations is denoted by  $\mathcal{P}$ . The *inversion metric* is the function  $d: \mathcal{P} \times \mathcal{P} \to \mathbb{R}$  defined by

$$d(\succ,\succ') = \frac{|(\succ \setminus \succ') \cup (\succ' \setminus \succ)|}{2}$$

(since all preference relations in  $\mathcal{P}$  have the same cardinality we have also:  $d(\succ, \succ') = |\succ \setminus \succ'| = |\succ' \setminus \succ |$ ).

Let  $\succ_0$  be a preference relation in  $\mathcal{P}$ . A metric on  $\mathcal{P}$  allows to determine which one of any two preference relations is closer to a third one. This comparison can be extended to equal-sized sets of preferences.

**Definition 1** Let C and C' be two disjoint nonempty subsets of  $\mathcal{P}$  with the same cardinality, and let  $\succ_0 \in \mathcal{P}$  be a preference relation on A. We say that C is at least as close to  $\succ_0$  as C', denoted by  $C \geq_{\succ_0} C'$ , if there is a one-to-one function  $\phi: C \to C'$  such that for all  $\succ \in C$ ,  $d(\succ, \succ_0) \leq d(\phi(\succ), \succ_0)$ . We also say that C is closer than C' to  $\succ_0$ , denoted by  $C \gg_{\succ_0} C'$ , if there is a one to one function  $\phi: C \to C'$  such that for all  $\succ \in C$ ,  $d(\succ, \succ_0) \leq d(\phi(\succ), \succ_0)$ , with strict inequality for at least one  $\succ \in C$ .

Using the concept of closeness the authors define the correspondence between preference profiles  $\pi \in \mathcal{P}^n$  and preference relations  $\succ \in \mathcal{P}$  depending on a natural parameter r called "preference profile  $\pi$  exhibits consensus of level r around  $\succ$ ". For any  $\pi = (\succ_1, \succ_2, \ldots, \succ_n) \in \mathcal{P}^n, \ \succ \in \mathcal{P}$ , and  $C \subseteq \mathcal{P}$ 

 $\mu_{\pi}(\succ) = |\{i \in \mathbb{N} : \succ_i = \succ\}|, \ \mu_{\pi}(C) = |\{i \in \mathbb{N} : \succ_i \in C\}|$ 

(obviously,  $\mu_{\pi}(C) = \sum_{\succ \in C} \mu_{\pi}(\succ)$ ).

**Definition 2** Let  $r \in \{1, 2, ..., \frac{K!}{2}\}$ , and let  $\succ_0 \in \mathcal{P}$ . A preference profile  $\pi \in \mathcal{P}^n$  exhibits consensus of level r around  $\succ_0$  if

- 1. for all disjoint subsets C, C' of  $\mathcal{P}$  with cardinality  $r, C \geq_{\succ_0} C' \to \mu_{\pi}(C) \geq \mu_{\pi}(C')$
- 2. there are disjoint subsets C, C' of  $\mathcal{P}$  with cardinality r, such that  $C >_{\succ_0} C'$ and  $\mu_{\pi}(C) > \mu_{\pi}(C')$ .

Proposition 1 of [1] states that the set of profiles that exhibit consensus of level r + 1 around  $\succ_0$  extends the set of profiles that exhibit consensus of level r around  $\succ_0$ . Thus, each preference relation  $\succ_0$  determines the hierarchy of preference profiles.

Let a preference profile  $\pi$  exhibit consensus of level r around  $\succ_0$ . We call  $\succ_0$  a *level* r consensus relation of  $\pi$  and simply consensus relation of  $\pi$  if  $r = \frac{K!}{2}$  (the level  $\frac{K!}{2}$  is the maximum level for which this concept is nontrivial).

A level r consensus relation  $\succ_0$  of profile  $\pi$  may be considered as one of probable social binary relations on the profile  $\pi$ . Theorem 1 of [1] states that if n is odd, then each profile  $\pi$  have at most one consensus relation  $\succ_0$  and the consensus relation  $\succ_0$  coincides with the relation  $M_{\pi}$  assigned by the majority rule to  $\pi$ . This result gives an interesting sufficient condition for transitivity of  $M_{\pi}$ . Furthermore, regardless of parity of n, the  $\succ_0$ -largest element  $a_1$  is a *Condorcet winner* on  $\pi$ .

For small values of r, level r consensus relations  $\succ_0$  of profile  $\pi$  have some interesting additional properties. Namely, the largest element  $a_1$  with respect  $\succ_0$  is selected by any scoring rule. A *scoring rule* is characterized by a nonincreasing sequence  $S = (S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_K)$  of non-negative real numbers for which  $S_1 > S_K$ . For  $k = 1, 2, \ldots, K$ , each individual with the preference relation  $\succ$ assigns  $S_k$  points to the k-th alternative in the linear order  $\succ$ . The scoring rule associated with S is the function  $V_S : \mathcal{P}^n \to 2^A$  whose value at any profile  $\pi = \{\succ_1, \succ_2, \ldots, \succ_n\}$  is the set  $V_S(\pi)$  of alternatives a with the maximum total score (i.e. with the maximum sum  $\sum_{1 \le i \le K} S_{k_i}$  where  $k_i$  is the rank of a in  $\succ_i$ ). Theorem 2 in [1] claims that if a preference profile  $\pi$  exhibits consensus of level  $r \le (K-1)!$  around  $\succ_0$ , then the  $\succ_0$ -largest element  $a_1$  belongs to  $V_S(\pi)$  for all scoring rules  $V_S$ .

However, the authors did not notice some combinatorial properties of the concepts introduced. We show that the hierarchy of preference profile partially collapses. In particular, any profile  $\pi \in \mathcal{P}$  that exhibits consensus of level (K-1)! around  $\succ_0$  in fact exhibits consensus of level 1 around  $\succ_0$ . Thus, it would be desirable to slightly adjust the assumption of Theorem 2 of [1].

**Theorem 1** For any natural number K > 2 there is a natural number  $c \leq \frac{K(K-1)}{4}$  such that for any natural numbers  $n \geq 1$  and  $r \in \{1, 2, \ldots, \frac{K!}{2} - c\}$ , any preference profile  $\pi \in \mathcal{P}^n$ , and any linear order  $\succ_0 \in \mathcal{P}$  the following conditions are equivalent

- 1.  $\pi$  exhibits consensus of level r around  $\succ_0$
- 2.  $\pi$  exhibits consensus of level 1 around  $\succ_0$ .

*Proof.* The implication  $2 \to 1$  follows from Proposition 1 of [1]. We will prove the reverse implication. Let  $\succ_0$  be a linear order in  $\mathcal{P}$  and let

$$\mathcal{P}_k(\succ_0) = \{\succ \in \mathcal{P} : d(\succ,\succ_0) = k\}.$$

for any natural number k. Obviously,  $|\mathcal{P}_k(\succ_0)|$  coincides with the number of permutations of  $\{1, 2, \ldots, K\}$  with k inversions, i.e. with the Mahonian number T(K, k) (sequence A008302 in OEIS, see [2]). The set  $\mathcal{P}_{\frac{K(K-1)}{2}}$  contains exactly one element. We denote this element by  $\overline{\succ_0}$ :  $\mathcal{P}_{\frac{K(K-1)}{2}} = \{\overline{\succ_0}\}$ .

Let c' be the number of k for which T(K, k) is odd:

$$c' = |\{k \in \mathbb{N} : T(K, k) \equiv 1 \pmod{2}\}|.$$

So,  $c' \leq \frac{K(K-1)}{2}$  because  $\frac{K(K-1)}{2}$  is the maximum distance between the linear orders in  $\mathcal{P}$ . Moreover, c' is even because

$$\sum_{0 \le k \le \frac{K(K-1)}{2}} T(K,k) = K! \equiv 0 \pmod{2}.$$

Let  $c = \frac{c'}{2}$ . Then the inequality  $c \le \frac{K(K-1)}{4}$  holds.

**Definition 3** For any natural number m a pair  $(C_1, C_2) \in 2^{\mathcal{P}} \times 2^{\mathcal{P}}$  is called *m*-balanced (around  $\succ_0$ ) iff

1.  $C_1 \cap C_2 = \emptyset$ , 2.  $|C_1| = |C_2| = m$ , 3.  $|C_1 \cap \mathcal{P}_k(\succ_0)| = |C_2 \cap \mathcal{P}_k(\succ_0)|$  for any  $k = 0, 1, \dots, \frac{K(K-1)}{2}$ .

**Lemma 1** Let  $\succ_1, \succ_2 \in \mathcal{P} \setminus \{\succ_0, \overline{\succ}_0\}$  and  $\succ_1 \neq \succ_2$ . Then there is a  $(\frac{K!}{2} - c)$ -balanced pair  $(C_1, C_2)$  for which  $\succ_1 \in C_1$  and  $\succ_2 \in C_2$ .

*Proof.* Note that  $T(K,k) \geq 2$  for any  $k \in \{1, 2, \ldots, \frac{K(K-1)}{2} - 1\}$  (this follows, for example, from a recurrence formula for T(K,k), see [2]). Using this fact, for each  $k \in \{k \in \mathbb{N} : T(K,k) \equiv 1 \pmod{2}\}$  choose a preference relation  $\succ_{(k)} \in \mathcal{P}_k(\succ_0) \setminus \{\succ_1, \succ_2\}$ . Let

$$\mathcal{P}'_{k}(\succ_{0}) = \begin{cases} \mathcal{P}_{k}(\succ_{0}) & \text{if } T(K,k) \equiv 0, \\ \mathcal{P}_{k}(\succ_{0}) \setminus \{\succ_{(k)}\} & \text{if } T(K,k) \equiv 1 \end{cases} \pmod{2}.$$

For each  $k \in \{1, \ldots, \frac{K(K-1)}{2} - 1\}$  choose a set  $C_{(k)}$  with properties

1.  $C_{(k)} \subseteq \mathcal{P}'_{k}(\succ_{0}),$ 2.  $|C_{(k)}| = \frac{|\mathcal{P}'_{k}(\succ_{0})|}{2},$ 3.  $d(\succ_{1},\succ_{0}) = k \to \succ_{1} \in C_{(k)},$ 4.  $\succ_{2} \notin C_{(k)}.$  4N. L. Poliakov

Let

$$C_{1} = \bigcup_{1 \le k \le \frac{K(K-1)}{2} - 1} C_{(k)} \text{ and } C_{2} = \bigcup_{1 \le k \le \frac{K(K-1)}{2} - 1} \mathcal{P}'_{k}(\succ_{0}) \setminus C_{(k)}$$

Obviously, items 1–3 of Definition 3 hold. Lemma 2 is proved.

**Lemma 2** For any natural number m and m-balanced pair  $(C_1, C_2)$  there is a one-to-one function  $\phi: C_1 \to C_2$  satisfying

$$d(\succ,\succ_0) = d(\phi(\succ),\succ_0)$$

for all  $\succ \in C_1$ .

*Proof.* By item 3 of Definition 3 for any  $k = 0, 1, \ldots, \frac{K(K-1)}{2}$  there is a one-to-one mappings  $\phi_k : C_1 \cap \mathcal{P}_k(\succ_0) \to C_2 \cap \mathcal{P}_k(\succ_0)$  (maybe empty if  $C_1 \cap \mathcal{P}_k(\succ_0) = \emptyset$ ). Obviously, we can put  $\phi = \bigcup_{0 \le i \le \frac{K(K-1)}{2}} \phi_k$ . Lemma 3 is proved.

**Corollary 1** For any natural number m and m-balanced pair  $(C_1, C_2)$ 

 $C_1 \geq_{\succ_0} C_2$  and  $C_2 \geq_{\succ_0} C_1$ .

*Proof.* Let  $\phi$  be a function from Lemma 2. Then

$$d(\succ,\succ_0) = d(\phi^{-1}(\succ),\succ_0)$$

for all  $\succ \in C_2$ , and it remains to recall Definition 1.

Let  $\pi \in \mathcal{P}^n$  and let  $\pi$  exhibit consensus of level  $r \in \{1, 2, \dots, \frac{K!}{2} - c\}$ around  $\succ_0$ . By Proposition 1 of [1]  $\pi$  exhibits consensus of level  $\frac{K!}{2} - c$  around  $\succ_0$ . Our next goal is to prove that item 1 of Definition 2 holds for the profile  $\pi$ and r = 1.

**Lemma 3** For any different  $\succ_1, \succ_2 \in \mathcal{P}$ 

$$d(\succ_1,\succ_0) \le d(\succ_2,\succ_0) \to \mu_{\pi}(\succ_1) \ge \mu_{\pi}(\succ_2).$$

*Proof.* Let  $\succ_1, \succ_2 \in \mathcal{P}, \succ_1 \neq \succ_2$  and  $d(\succ_1, \succ_0) \leq d(\succ_2, \succ_0)$ . First, let  $\{\succ_1, \succ_2\} \cap \{\succ_0, \overline{\succ}_0\} = \emptyset$ . Consider a  $(\frac{K!}{2} - c)$ -balanced pair  $(C_1, C_2)$  for which  $\succ_2 \in C_1$  and  $\succ_1 \in C_2$ , and a on-to-one function  $\phi : C_1 \to C_2$  satisfying

$$d(\succ,\succ_0) = d(\phi(\succ),\succ_0)$$

for all  $\succ \in C_1$ . By Definition 2 and Corollary 3 we have

$$\mu_{\pi}(C_1) = \mu_{\pi}(C_2). \tag{1}$$

Let  $C'_1 = (C_1 \setminus \{\succ_2\}) \cup \{\succ_1\}$  and  $C'_2 = (C_2 \setminus \{\succ_1\}) \cup \{\succ_2\}$ . Consider the function  $\phi' : C'_1 \to C'_2$  defined by

$$\phi'(\succ) = \begin{cases} \succ_2 & \text{if } \succ = \succ_1, \\ \phi(\succ_2) & \text{if } \succ = \phi^{-1}(\succ_1) \neq \succ_2, \\ \phi(\succ) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

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For all  $\succ \in C'_1$  we have  $d(\succ, \succ_0) \leq d(\phi'(\succ), \succ_0)$ , so  $C'_1 \geq_{\succ_0} C'_2$  by Definition 1. Hence, by Definition 2

$$\mu_{\pi}(C_1') \ge \mu_{\pi}(C_2'). \tag{2}$$

Since  $(\forall C \subseteq \mathcal{P}) \mu_{\pi}(C) = \sum_{\succ \in C} \mu_{\pi}(\succ)$ , we have

$$\mu_{\pi}(C_1') = \mu_{\pi}(C_1) - \mu_{\pi}(\succ_2) + \mu_{\pi}(\succ_1) \text{ and } \mu_{\pi}(C_2') = \mu_{\pi}(C_2) - \mu_{\pi}(\succ_1) + \mu_{\pi}(\succ_2).$$
(3)

Then by (1), (2) and (3)

$$\mu_{\pi}(\succ_1) - \mu_{\pi}(\succ_2) \ge \mu_{\pi}(\succ_2) - \mu_{\pi}(\succ_1),$$

and, finally,

$$\mu_{\pi}(\succ_1) \ge \mu_{\pi}(\succ_2).$$

For further discussion, note that this implies

$$d(\succ_1,\succ_0) = d(\succ_2,\succ_0) \to \mu_\pi(\succ_1) = \mu_\pi(\succ_2).$$
(4)

for all different  $\succ_1, \succ_2 \in \mathcal{P}$ .

Consider the remaining cases.

Let  $\succ_1 = \succ_0$  and  $\succ_2 \neq \overleftarrow{\succ}_0$ . Then denote  $C_1'' = (C_1 \setminus \{\succ_2\}) \cup \{\succ_0\}$  and  $C_2'' = (C_1 \setminus \{\phi(\succ_2)\}) \cup \{\succ_2\}$ . Consider the function  $\phi'' : C_1'' \to C_2$  defined by

$$\phi''(\succ) = \begin{cases} \succ_2 & \text{if } \succ = \succ_0, \\ \phi(\succ) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

For all  $\succ \in C_1''$  we have  $d(\succ, \succ_0) \leq d(\phi''(\succ), \succ_0)$  and, further,  $C_1'' \geq_{\succ_0} C_2''$ . Reasoning as before we have

$$\mu_{\pi}(\succ_0) - \mu_{\pi}(\succ_2) \ge \mu_{\pi}(\succ_2) - \mu_{\pi}(\phi(\succ_2)).$$

Since  $d(\succ_2, \succ_0) = d(\phi(\succ_2), \succ_0)$ , we have  $\mu_{\pi}(\succ_2) = \mu_{\pi}(\phi(\succ_2))$  by (4). Finally,

$$\mu_{\pi}(\succ_0) \ge \mu_{\pi}(\succ_2)$$

In the case  $\succ_2 = \overline{\succ}_0$  and  $\succ_1 \neq \succ_0$ , the arguments are similar.

In the latter case  $\succ_1 = \succ_0$  and  $\succ_2 = \overline{\succ}_0$ . We can choose a preference relation  $\succ^* \in \mathcal{P} \setminus \{\succ_0, \overline{\succ}_0\}$ . According to the above, we have

$$\mu_{\pi}(\succ_1) \ge \mu_{\pi}(\succ^*) \ge \mu_{\pi}(\succ_2).$$

Lemma 3 is proved.

To prove the theorem it remains to show that item 2 of Definition 2 holds for the profile  $\pi$  and r = 1. Assume  $\mu_{\pi}(\overline{\succ}_0) = \emptyset$ . Then, for every preference relation  $\succ$  of profile  $\pi$  we have

$$d(\succ,\succ_0) > d(\overleftarrow{\succ}_0,\succ_0)$$
 and  $\mu_{\pi}(\succ) > \mu_{\pi}(\overleftarrow{\succ}_0)$ .

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In the opposite case, assume that item 2 of Definition 2 is not hold for the profile  $\pi$  and r = 1. Then by Lemma 3 the profile  $\pi$  contains the same number of all linear orders in  $\mathcal{P}$ . Thus,  $\pi$  does not exhibit consensus of any level, a contradiction.

Theorem 1 is proved.

**Corollary 2** Let profile  $\pi$  exhibit consensus of level (K-1)! around  $\succ_0$ . Then  $\pi$  exhibits consensus of level 1 around  $\succ_0$ .

*Proof.* Let  $K \ge 4$ . Then it suffices to prove the inequality

$$(K-1)! \le \frac{K!}{2} - \frac{K(K-1)}{4}.$$

This is easily by induction. For K = 3 we can use the sufficiency of inequality

$$(K-1)! \le \frac{K!}{2} - \frac{|\{k: T(K,k) = 1 \pmod{2}\}|}{2}$$

(for K = 3 we have  $|\{k : T(3, k) = 1 \pmod{2}\}| = 2$ ).

## References

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